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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred 
by Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Judicial Code and by Rule 3 of 
the Utah Rul es of .Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the trial court was correct in law in 
determining that a release was sufficiently clean arid unequivocal 
to release defendant from liability for its alleged negligence? 
See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co, , 793 p.2d 362, 370 (Utah 
1990) (upholding exculpatory agreement). The applicable standard 
of appellate review for a question of law is "review for 
correctness . . . ." Hansen v. Dept. of Financial Institutions, 
858 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
There are no determi na t::i i e sta to ites, const: tutiona] 
provisions, ordinances, rules or regulations in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Charles J. Russ ("Russ") brought this 
wrongful death action against Woodside Homes, Inc. ("Woodside"), 
for the death of i i i s • w:i f e, Rose Russ ("M t: s , Ri iss ") , who d i < H1 
approximately two weeks after she fell at a Woodside construction 
site. Russ and Mrs. Russ (collective!v : - "Russes") signed an 
exculpat i-jreement releas .:•. *.*. , «. . ; :i a b. i 1 i ty.
 ( .LI, 
Russ believes he is entitled to bring this action because the 
1 
agreement did not expressly mention releasing Woodside for 
liability from its own alleged negligence. Woodside, on the 
other hand, counters that under Utah law, the exculpatory 
agreement is binding whether or not it mentioned Woodside's 
liability for its alleged negligence. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On February 28, 1994, Russ filed his wrongful death 
complaint ("Complaint"); Woodside filed its Answer on March 21, 
1994. [R. 12, 18]. 
On August 4, 1994, Woodside filed a motion for summary 
judgment. [R. 25, 33]. The trial court granted Woodside's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on October 27, 1994. [R. 73] . 
On October 31, 1994, Russ filed a notice of appeal and 
on February 8, 1995, served his Brief of Appellant on Woodside. 
[R. 75] . 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Woodside sought summary judgment in its favor on 
grounds that an exculpatory agreement barred Russ' action. The 
trial court granted Woodside7s motion and issued its Memorandum 
Decision on September 19, 1994. [R. 70, 73] (See Memorandum 
Decision attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "A."). The trial 
court found that, even though the exculpatory agreement did not 
specifically address Woodside's alleged negligence, "the fact 
that the language in the release holds defendant harmless xto the 
fullest extent permitted by law' would seem to include negligent 
2 
acts. The 1 aw i n most circumstances w:i ] 1 n :>t: a ] ] ov> a release of 
intentional torts or gross negligence, but where the contract 
language provides a release to the 'fullest extent permitted by 
1 av • woi :i ] :i seen t a s a ma11er :)f coui se t:o : i ii :: 1 uc:ie negligent 
acts. " [R. 69] . 
Additionally, the trial court observed that the 
contract described the various dangers c if c :onstn ictd on site and 
that the agreement "specifically held defendant harmless for 
'death, accident, injury or other occurrence;' in fact, Plaintiff 
in his Complaint uses this same specif:! c language when he states 
'at the time of the accident' described herein " [R. 69]. Thus, 
the trial court was "persuaded that Plaintiff and Decedent were 
put on notice as to the type of possible injury which could be 
sustained in a visit to the job site and that it was their intent 
to release Defendant : • r ;• .•;! • Jtractors from anj possible 
negligent acts." Id. 
D* STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 12 1 992 , the R\ isses and Woodsd cie s:i gried 
an agreement under which Woodside agreed to construct a home for 
the Russes. [R. 26] . The agreement contained a release (the 
"Russ Release" :: r "Release") statd ng that: • 
[t]he construction site is a dangerous place 
to visit. Buyer agrees to exercise extreme 
caution if the Buyer chooses to visit the 
site, to limit the number of such visits, and 
to refrain from allowing Buyer's or other 
children to accompany Buyer on such visits. 
Buyer, to the fullest extent permitted by 
law, agrees to hold harmless Woodside 
3 
(including its affiliates and subsidiaries 
and other contractors and subcontractors and 
their agents and employees) from any and all 
claims, damages, loss and expenses, including 
but not limited to attorneys' fees, arising 
out of any death, accident, injury, or other 
occurrence resulting from visits to the job 
site by Buyer or Buyer's family or other 
guests. 
[R. 26] (See Agreement to Commence Construction, attached hereto 
as Addendum Exhibit "B."). 
Russ alleged that he and Mrs. Russ visited the job site 
a few days before Thanksgiving, 1992. [R. 6-7]. Russ also 
alleged that while visiting the job site, Mrs. Russ fell into a 
hole in the driveway of the home and was injured. [R. 6] Russ 
further alleged that Mrs. Russ died approximately two weeks later 
on December 12, 1992. [R. 5]. On March 1, 1994, Russ.filed suit 
alleging survival of action for injury and wrongful death. 
[R. 9] . 
It is worth noting that Russ' Statement of the Facts 
and Argument include numerous facts not in the record. The Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure require a party's factual statements 
to be supported by the record. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that it will not consider factual 
allegations unsupported by the record. See Uckerman v. Lincoln 
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (refusing to 
consider unsupported factual contentions). Not only are many of 
the facts, too numerous to burden the Court with here, 
unsupported in the record, they are also irrelevant surplusage 
4 
designed to pique the emotions of this Court. Thus, Woodside 
urges the Court to ignore those facts not supported by the 
record. 
E. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Russ Release is valid, even though it did not 
specifically address Woodside's alleged negligence, under Freund 
v. Utah Power & Light. 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990) (upholding 
indemnity agreement). The court found in Freund that "it is not 
necessary that . . . exculpatory language refer[] expressly to 
the negligence of the indemnitee . . . ." Id. at 370. Thus, the 
Russ Release is valid. 
Additionally, the Russ Release remains valid under the 
public servant exception to the general rule enforcing releases. 
Under that exception, courts bar public servants from 
contractually limiting their liability. Woodside, however, is 
not a public servant. Thus, the public servant exception does 
not apply. 
Russ also argues that Woodside failed to meets its 
burden of proof by showing that Mrs. Russ unequivocally agreed to 
the Russ Release. Russ improperly raises this issue on appeal 
because the issue was not argued below. Even assuming the 
burden-of-proof argument was considered below, however, there is 
no factual dispute that Mrs. Russ, signed and thereby agreed to 
the Russ Release. Under Utah law, a party may not deny knowledge 
5 
of an agreement to which she is a signatory. Thus, Russ7 burden-
of-proof argument also fails as a matter of law.1 
F. ARGUMENT 
I. RUSS RELEASE IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE UNDER GENERAL 
RULE. 
A. The Russ Release Is Valid Even Though It Did Not 
Specifically Discuss Woodsidefs Alleged 
Negligence. 
A release from liability for negligence is enforceable 
where the intention to release one from liability for one's 
alleged negligence is clearly and unequivocally expressed.2 
Freund, 793 P.2d at 370. However, "it is not necessary that the 
exculpatory language refers expressly to the negligence of the 
indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be 'clearly 
implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement, 
and the surrounding facts and circumstances.'" Id. at 370, 
(quoting Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority v. Tri-Delta 
Construction Corp.. 487 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1985). Thus, even 
1
 Russ also raises numerous public policy arguments and a 
claim that the Russ Release does not operate against Mrs. Russ' 
heirs. These arguments also fail for the reasons stated herein. 
2
 Russ relies heavily upon the thirty-year old case of 
Union Pacific Rail Road v. El Paso -Natural Gas Company to argue 
that the Russ Release was not unequivocal. See Brief of 
Appellant at 10 (citing 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965)). In the three 
decades since Union Pacific, however, Utah courts have recognized 
a "growing trend" to relax the strictness of the rules governing 
exculpatory agreements. Freund, 793 P.2d at 370; see also 
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (identifying trend to limit strict construction of 
releases and related agreements). Thus, Union Pacific is 
inapplicable to the case at bar. 
6 
though the Russ Release did not mention Woodside's negligence, it 
was still sufficiently clear to bind Russ to his promise to hold 
Woodside harmless. 
B. The MBroad Sweep" Of The Russ Release Clearly 
Identified Parties' Intent To Release Woodside 
From Negligence Claims. 
The Russ Release clearly identified that the Russes and 
Woodside intended that Woodside be held harmless for Woodside's 
alleged negligence. A release from one's negligent conduct is 
enforceable where "the broad sweep of the language employed by 
the parties clearly covers those instances in which the licensor 
may be negligent." Freund. 793 P.2d at 371. The Freund court 
found that language releasing the indemnitee from "any and all 
claims . . . " constituted sufficiently broad wording to include 
release from liability for one's alleged negligence. Similarly, 
the Russ Release released Woodside from "any and all claims 
. . . ." [R. 70]. Under the Freund analysis, then, the broad 
sweep of the Russ Release clearly expressed the parties intent to 
hold Woodside harmless. 
Moreover, as the trial court observed, the Russ Release 
held Woodside harmless "to the fullest extent permitted by law 
. . . ." [R. 70]. The broad sweep of that language also 
suggests that the parties contemplated that Russ would hold 
Woodside harmless for all legally-permissible liability, 
7 
including alleged negligence.3 Additionally, the Russ Release 
also released Woodside for injury from any "accident." In his 
complaint, Russ admits that Mrs. Russ was injured in an 
"accident." [R. 7, 1 11]. It follows, then, that the Russ 
Release clearly established the Russes' intent to release 
Woodside from injuries arising from accidents. Consequently, 
Russ may not maintain this action. 
C. The Russes" Non-Commercial Status Does Not 
Invalidate Russ Release. 
Russ appears to contend that since the Russes were not 
"commercially sophisticated," Freund is inapplicable to their 
action.4 Such an argument is without merit. Under Utah law, 
releases are enforced between a private and a commercial party. 
See Berube v. Fashion Centre, 771 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Utah 1989) 
(finding release enforceable as a matter of law). 
Moreover, Russ' argument is simply a plea to avoid the 
effects of a poor bargain. Utah courts have repeatedly refused 
to permit plaintiffs such an escape. See Equitable Life & 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d. 1187, 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (stating that "sellers and buyers should be able to 
Russ counters that "[m]ost consumers" are confused by 
such language. B:lef of Appellant at 20. How most consumers 
interpret the Russ Release is irrelevant. Moreover, Russ 
presents no evidence that Mrs. Russ was confused by the language. 
4
 Contrary to Russ' assertion, a close reading of Freund 
shows that the case did not involve a contract between 
"commercially sophisticated parties." See Brief of Appellant at 
21; 793 P.2d at 370. 
8 
contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism 
by the courts in the alleviation of one side or another from the 
effects of a poor bargain."); see also Johnston v. Austin, 748 
P.2d 1084, 1089 (Utah 1988) (applying same doctrine in real 
estate bargain); see also Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 528 (Md. 
1994) (enforcing release even though indemnitor was 
"unsophisticated," eighteen-year-old investor). In short, 
whether or not the Russes were unseasoned negotiators should not 
sway this Court from its position in Freund. 
II. SO-CALLED MINORITY RULE IS INAPPLICABLE TO WOODSIDE. 
A. The Minority Rule Is Simply Exception To The 
General Rule. 
The so-called minority rule is inapplicable because 
Woodside is not a public servant. Russ boldly suggests that the 
minority rule is that all "exculpatory clauses are violative of 
public policy," citing Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing 
& Salvage Co.. 372 U.S. 697 (1963), for that proposition.5 Brief 
of Appellant at 12. Dixilyn contains no such rule. Instead, 
Dixilyn concludes that exculpatory contracts indemnifying public 
servants are unenforceable. Id. at 698 (quoting Bisso v. Inland 
Waterways Corp., 75 S.Ct. 629 (1955) . Thus, the minority rule, 
5
 Russ also cites California Civil Code section 1668 and 
Louisiana Civil Code Annotated section 2004 for the proposition 
that exculpatory clauses are invalid. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 
(1994); La. Civ. Code Ann. § 2004 (1988). The California code, 
however, voids only releases from gross negligence. The 
Louisiana code expresses only the public policy of that state. 
Therefore, both statutes are inapplicable to this case. 
9 
which is more often phrased as the exception to the general rule, 
is that exculpatory contracts are generally enforceable, except 
where the indemnitee is a public servant.6 
B. Woodside Is Not Public Servant Under Krohnert 
Test. 
Woodside is not a public servant under the commonly-
accepted test for determining whether an indemnitee is a public 
servant. In Krohnert v. Yacht Systems Hawaii. Inc., the court 
set out numerous criteria for determining whether an indemnitee 
is a public servant.7 664 P.2d 738, 745 (Hawaii App. 1983) 
(finding exculpatory clause "permissible.") (quoting Tunkl v. 
6
 See Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 
1195, 1203 (Kan. App. 1992) (stating that "[t]he rule seems to be 
that, unless against public policy, a contract exempting 
liability will be enforced . . . . " ) ; 6A Corbin on Contracts 
§ 1472 (1962) (stating that "[i]t is generally held that those 
who are not engaged in public service may properly bargain 
against liability for harm caused by their ordinary negligence in 
performance of contractual duty . . . . " ) . 
7
 Russ cites four cases as support for this test. Three of 
those four found that the defendant was not a public servant and 
the exculpatory contract was valid. See Krohnert, 664 P.2d at 
745 (finding defendant was not public servant); Lynch v. Santa Fe 
National Bank, 627 P.2d 1247, 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (finding 
defendant was not public servant); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 
533 A.2d 1316, 1323 (Md. App. 1987) (finding defendant was not 
public servant). The fourth, Tunkl v. Regents of University of 
California, held that a hospital is a public servant. 383 P.2d 
447 (Calif. 1963) (stating that "admission room of a hospital 
contains no bargaining table . . . . " ) . Since Tunkl concerned a 
hospital, which has obvious and substantial public necessity, it 
is inapplicable to this action. 
10 
Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445-446 
(1963) . The factors8 are 
1. Whether the business is publicly regulated. 
2. Whether the business' services are of practical 
necessity for some members of the public. 
3. Whether the business holds itself out to any 
member of the public. 
4. Whether because of the essential nature of the 
service, the party has a distinct bargaining 
advantage. 
5. Whether the contract at issue is an adhesion 
contract. 
6. Whether the purchaser or property is placed under 
the control of the service provider. 
Krohnert, 664 P.2d at 744-45. Woodside clearly fails each of 
these criterion and thus, is not a public servant. 
C. Woodside*s Regulation Does Not Transform It Into A 
Public Servant, 
Simply because Woodside is state-regulated to some 
extent, like a substantial number of other businesses, does not 
transform Woodside into a public servant. See Lee v. Sun Valley 
Co., 695 P.2d 361, 363 (Idaho 1984) (holding that "mere fact that 
[defendant] is licensed by the state does not impose a public 
duty" upon defendant); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving 
Club, Inc.. 392 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (enforcing 
exculpatory agreement despite government regulation of 
8
 None of these factors is dispositive of public servant 
designation. See Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist.. 758 P.2d 
968, 971 (Wash. 1988) (evaluating Krohnert test). 
11 
defendant's conduct). Russ argues that regulations requiring 
that Woodside be licensed makes it a public servant. See Brief 
of Appellant at 17. However, a construction contractor's 
services "are not qualitatively the same kind as those provided 
by common carriers, hospitals, doctors or public utilities, which 
are 'generally thought suitable for regulation.'" Malecha, 392 
N.W.2d at 731 (citation omitted). Thus, that Woodside is 
government-regulated does not transform it into a public servant. 
D. Woodside#s Service Is Important. But Not An 
Absolute Necessity. 
Woodside's services fill an important societal need, 
but are not so essential as to justify public servant 
designation. Courts typically compare essential services to 
indispensable services such as police protection9 and hospital 
care.10 In both examples, parties have little or no choice about 
with whom they may contract. The Russes, on the other hand, 
present no evidence that they could not have contracted with 
someone other than Woodside to build their home. Consequently, 
Woodside is not a public servant. 
E. Woodside Was Under No Duty To Serve The Public. 
This criteria is often reserved for business entities 
who have a duty to "give reasonable service to all persons who 
9
 See Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co.. 533 A.2d. 1316, 1323 
(Md. App. 1987) (contrasting alarm company's services with 
essential nature of police services). 
10
 Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447. 
12 
apply . . . ," such as common carriers, public warehousemen and 
innkeepers. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446, n.12. While Woodside, of 
course, contracts with the public, it has no duty to do so. 
Consequently, it is not a public servant under this criteria. 
P. Since Russes Had Choice Not To Contract With 
Woodside, Woodside Did Not En-joy Superior 
Bargaining Position, 
Since the Russes were free to contract with other 
homebuilders, Woodside was not in a superior bargaining position. 
Superior bargaining power requires "the absence of alternatives . 
. . ." Lynch, 627 P.2d at 1250; see also Krohnert, 664 P.2d at 
744. In the case at bar, Russ has presented no evidence that the 
Russes had no alternative but to contract with Woodside. Russ 
also argues that the Russes were given no chance to "opt out" of 
the exculpatory clause. Brief of Appellant at 18. However, 
"[p]roof that [plaintiff] had no opportunity to negotiate the 
terms of the exculpatory agreement is not enough to show a 
disparity of bargaining power." Malecha, 392 N.W.2d at 730. In 
short, the Russes offered no evidence that contracting services 
"could not be obtained elsewhere." Id. Consequently, Woodside 
did not enjoy a superior bargaining position in negotiating the 
Russ Release. 
G. The Russ Release Was Not A Contract Of Adhesion. 
The Russ Release was not a contract of adhesion. A 
contract of adhesion is an agreement forced, on a "'take it or 
leave it basis,'" on one party by another who has superior 
13 
bargaining strength. Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 786 P.2d 
763, 766 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (enforcing insurance contract) 
(citation omitted).u In short, an adhesion contract is one in 
which the party has no alternatives. As has been shown, the 
Russes presented no evidence that they had no choice but to 
contract with Woodside. Thus, the Russ Release was not a 
contract of adhesion. 
H. Woodside Did Not Control Russes Or Their Property, 
The Russes and their property were not decisively under 
Woodside's control. While Woodside was in partial, temporary 
control of the property during construction, the Russ Release 
expressly discouraged the Russes from visiting the site. 
Moreover, the Russes visit to the construction site was 
completely voluntary. See Banfield v. Louis, 589 So. 2d 441, 446 
(Fla. App. 1991) (refusing to find business was public servant 
where plaintiff submitted to defendant's control on "completely 
voluntary" basis.). The control factor contemplates 
circumstances where the plaintiff is at the complete mercy of, 
for example, a hospital, or a school. See Tunkl, 3 83 P.2d at 
441; Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. The Russes were under no such 
complete and dominating control. 
Moreover, "that the terms of a contract are embodied in a 
written form developed by one of the parties does not 
automatically render it either a contract of adhesion or 
unenforceable." Resource Mgt. Co. v. Western Ranch & Livestock 
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1048 (Utah 1985) (enforcing contract). 
14 
For these reasons, Woodside fulfills none of the 
criteria for a public servant and the minority rule does not 
apply to Woodside. Instead, under the general rule, the Russ 
Release is enforceable.12 
12
 Russ provides a lengthy string citation in his argument 
in which nearly all of the case law agrees that under the general 
rule, private, exculpatory contracts are enforceable. Brief of 
Appellant at 12-13, citing Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, 800 P.2d 
1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (permitting party to 
"contractually absolve itself from liability . . . . " ) ; Heil 
Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989) 
(stating that "[e]xculpatory agreements are not necessarily void 
. . . . " ) ; Krohnert v. Yacht Systems Hawaii, Inc., 664 P.2d 738 
(Hawaii App. 1983) (discussed supra pp. 10-11); Macek v. 
Schooners Inc. , 586 N.E.2d. 442, 444 (111. App. 1991) 
(permitting exculpatory clauses where clear and unequivocal); 
Elite Professionals v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Kan. 
App. 1992) (permitting disclaimer of liability); Schrier v. 
Beltway Alarm Co.. 533 A.2d 1316 (Md. App. 1987) (enforcing 
exculpatory agreement); Jones v. Walt Disney World Co., 409 
F. Supp. 526, 528 (W.D. N.Y. 1976) (stating that exculpatory 
clauses are considered valid); Lago v. Krollage, 575 N.E.2d 107, 
110 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that exculpatory clauses are "generally 
enforced"); Orlett v. Suburban Propane, 561 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 
(Ohio App. 1989) (stating that contract "evading liability for 
negligence will be enforced . . . . " ) ; Childress v. Madison 
County, 777 S.W.2d. 1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that 
"parties may contract that one shall not be liable for his 
negligence . . . . " ) ; Waaenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 758 P.2d 
968, 970 (Wash. 1988) (stating that it is "quite possible" to 
limit liability for own negligence); Discount Fabric House, Inc. 
v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Wis. 1984) 
(permitting exculpatory contracts that do not violate public 
policy); Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 1986) 
(stating that "Wyoming courts enforce exculpatory clauses . . . 
if the clause is not contrary to public policy."); Dobratz v. 
Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Wis. 1991) (stating that 
"exculpatory contracts are not 'automatically' void . . . . " ) . 
Only three cases do not discuss the general rule. See Stanek v. 
National Bank of Detroit, 430 N.W.2d 819, 821 (Mich. App. 1988) 
(involving statutory restriction on releases in favor of banks); 
Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So.2d 378 (Miss. 1982) (involving lease 
rental agreement); Richardson-Wayland Electrical Corp. v. 
Virginia Electrical & Power Co.. 247 S.E.2d 465, 467 (Va. 1978) 
(continued...) 
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III. RUSS IMPROPERLY RAISES BURDEN OF PROOF ARGUMENT. 
Russ improperly raises the issue that Woodside failed 
to establish that Russ clearly and unequivocally agreed to the 
Russ Release. An appellant may not raise an issue on appeal that 
was not properly argued below. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc., 
815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah App. 1991) (summary judgment appeal 
stating that "[w]e normally will not consider arguments on appeal 
which were not raised before the trial court."). Russ clearly 
never raised below the issue of whether Mrs. Russ unequivocally 
agreed to the Release.13 Thus# Russ is not entitled to raise 
this issue on appeal. 
Even if the Court considers the issue of whether Russ 
unequivocally agreed to the Release as properly before the Court, 
Russ' argument is still without merit for several reasons. For 
example, Russ transparently argues that "the contract only shows 
that Mrs. Russ signed a contract . . . , but did not understand 
the release." Russ can not claim that Mrs. Russ did not 
understand the Release. See Western Properties v. Southern Utah 
12(. . .continued) 
(stating that public service company can not relieve itself from 
liability). None of those cases are applicable here. 
13
 In the only possible reference to this issue, Russ raises 
a theoretical question about whether a hypothetical plaintiff has 
"read" a contract, citing a different case than the one upon 
which he relies in his appeal Brief. [R. 39] . Whether a generic 
plaintiff has read a contract is completely distinct from whether 
Woodside met the heightened standard of law which Russ now 
contends is at issue. In short, no where below does Russ discuss 
a requirement that Woodside has the burden to prove that Russ 
clearly and unequivocally agreed to the Release. 
16 
Aviation. 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "a 
signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of the contract 
. . . . " ) ; see also Sweeney v. Taco Bell. Inc.. 824 S.W.2d 289, 
291 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding that " [a]s a general rule, a 
written release cannot be avoided on the ground that the releasor 
was ignorant of, or mistaken about, the contents of the release, 
or failed to read it before signing."). Moreover, Russ presents 
no evidence that Mrs. Russ did not understand the Release to 
counter the fact that, since Mrs. Russ signed the Release, she 
understood it. Thus, even if this issue is properly before the 
court, it is clear that the Russes had full knowledge of the 
contents of the Russ Release. 
Russ also argues, without citation to authority, that 
the Russ Release was invalid because it was not printed in bold 
type and because Russ did not initial the exculpatory clause.14 
A contract's format is generally not a determinant of the 
agreement's validity. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 
706 P.2d 1028, 1048 (Utah 1985) (enforcing contract) (quoting 
Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co.. 350 F.2d 445 (1965)). 
"Far more important is whether key terms are 'hidden in a maze of 
fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). Russ presents no evidence that the Release 
was deceptive. To the contrary, the simple, one-page contract 
14
 This argument appears to be an attempt to label the Russ 
Release unconscionable. See, generally. Resource Management Co. 
v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). 
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displayed the release language prominently in the middle of the 
page. Thus, Russ' claim that the Russ Release was deceptive is 
no bar to summary judgment. 
IV. RUSS' PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Russ makes numerous public policy arguments that are 
without merit. For example, Russ argues that this Court should 
invalidate the Russ Release lest injured parties be forced to 
rely on government medical assistance, thereby hastening the 
growth of the national debt. Brief of Appellant at 15. 
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence in support of this point, 
Russ misunderstands the public policy considerations behind 
releases. Releases are designed to shift the burden of liability 
among parties and their insurers, not to shift that burden to the 
federal government. See Pickhover v . Smith1s Management Corp., 
771 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (discussing limitation of 
strict construction rule). In short, it is not the government's 
responsibility to guard against an indemnitor's injury. 
Russ also argues that the Russ Release should not be 
enforced because Russ suffered personal injury (i.e. death) 
rather then property injury. Brief of Appellant at 13. Russ 
cites Fireman's Fund v. Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc. 
for the proposition that the so-called minority rule is more 
compelling in personal injury cases. See 417 N.E.2d 131, 134 
(111. 1980). Fireman's Fund, however, is utterly inapplicable to 
the case at bar. Fireman's Fund addressed whether a party could 
18 
recover in tort for economic damages. Id. at 133-34. Fireman's 
Fund does not hold that exculpatory contracts are even disfavored 
in personal injury claims. Instead, it is clear that most cases 
enforcing releases in fact involve personal injury claims. See, 
e.g., Freund, 793 P.2d at 370. For these reasons, Russ' public 
policy arguments fail as a matter of law. 
V. RUSS RELEASE OPERATES AGAINST SURVIVOR. 
In a final attempt to salvage his cause of action, Russ 
argues that the Russ Release operates only against the decedent, 
who signed the release, but not against her survivors.15 The 
majority view is that release or settlement by a victim bars any 
subsequent wrongful death action by the victim's survivors. 
McClellan v. Boehmer. 700 S.W.2d. 687, 690 (Tex. App. 1985) 
(stating that release bound descendant's beneficiaries). It 
follows, then, that the Russ Release operates against Russ. 
G. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Woodside respectfully 
urges this Court to affirm the trial court's decision granting 
summary judgment in Woodside's favor and against Russ. 
15
 Russ also asks the Court to reverse the trial court 
because Russ has had insufficient time to conduct discovery. 
Notwithstanding the fact that more than one year has passed since 
Russ filed his Complaint, Russ failed to file the appropriate 
Rule 56(f) memorandum necessary to postpone summary judgment. 
Utah. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (1994); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 
740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (awarding summary judgment 
for lack of sufficient Rule 56(f) memorandum). Consequently, 
Russ' discovery argument is no bar to summary judgment. 
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DATED this zi day of March, 1995. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
ivfl'S. Felt / Pax 
Robert 0. Rice 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES J. RUSS, SR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODSIDE HOMES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and DOES I through XXX, 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940400115 
DATE: September 19, 1994 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for consideration of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Having received and considered Defendant's Motion, together with 
memoranda in support, in opposition and in reply to the motion, the Court hereby grants the 
motion as there are no genuine or material facts at issue and judgment is made as a matter of 
law. 
Specifically, the Court finds as follows: 
On September 12, 1992, Defendant Woodside contracted with Charles J. and Rose P. 
Russ (Plaintiff and Decedent) to build a home, and as part of that contract, signed an 
agreement which contained various provisions, including a release for any injuries which 
might occur on the job site. The provision stated that: 
[t]he construction site is a dangerous place to visit. Buyer agrees to exercise extreme 
caution if the Buyer chooses to visit the site, to limit the number of such visits, and to 
refrain from allowing Buyer or other children to accompany Buyer on such visits. 
Buyer, to the fullest extent permitted by law, agrees to hold harmless Woodside 
(including its affiliates and subsidiaries and other contractors and subcontractors and 
their agents and employees) from any and all claims, damages, loss and expenses, 
including but not limited to attorney's fees arising out of any death, accident, injury, 
or other occurrence resulting from visits to the job site by Buyer or Buyer's family or 
other guests. (Emphasis added.) 
While visiting the construction site of the home, Decedent fell into a hole in the 
driveway of the home and was injured. Decedent died on December 12, 1992, presumably 
as a result of those injuries. Plaintiff brought suit on March 1, 1994. 
Plaintiff argues that the terms of the release in the contract covering the Russ-
Woodside Homes transaction were not clearly and unequivocally stated and therefore the 
release is not effective. Plaintiff argues that since the causative factor, i.e., Defendant's 
negligence, is not stated in the release, that the possibility of negligent acts was not intended 
by the parties to be controlled by the release. 
While the release may not specifically address causative factors, or specifically 
mention the effect of any negligence on the part of the Defendant, the fact that the language 
in the release holds Defendant harmless "to the fullest extent permitted by law" would seem 
to include negligent acts. The law in most circumstances will not allow a release of 
intentional torts or gross negligence, but where the contract language provides a release to 
the "fullest extent permitted by law," would seem as a matter of course to include negligent 
acts. 
The language in the release is very specific as to the type of injury the parties 
foresaw. The Agreement warned Plaintiff and his wife that a construction site was a 
dangerous place to visit and suggested that visits be limited and to use extreme caution when 
making visits. Additionally, the release specifically held Defendant harmless from "death, 
accident, injury or other occurrence;" in fact, Plaintiff in his Complaint uses this same 
specific language when he states "at the time of the accident described herein." 
This Court is persuaded that Plaintiff and Decedent were put on notice as to the type 
of possible injury which could be sustained in a visit to the job site and that it was their 
intent to release Defendant or its subcontractors from any possible negligent acts. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 19th day of September, 1994. 
BYT 
cc: Paul S. Felt, Esq. 
Charles F. Abbott, Esq. 
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Exhibit B 
ADDENDUM T 
AGREEMENT TO COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION 
Relet 
l/we( 
itaa of fcemott Monejufncl nemovsjof Contingencies 
9 (hereinafter referradto aa Buyer, a y t whathf er one or more) 
horoby ri/leate toyjoodsld* \ lornas Co poration (herelnaf tar rtlt rrad to aa Woodslde) the turn of I / / * P / / nLf **—'
 f l| 
(consisting of i ^ T r O f t ^ Earneat Monay Deposit previously reoelved by Woodslde *nd ^n additional dep08l\of *IQ$LJ3LJJ, ^ 
5? consideration fpr Woodaldo beginning construction on^he^hgm* to ba built on Lot ^ ' of J^fi-ruJ^ tt&Gi*ffim& 
County of ^WhU^- . City of UfmMlrjh* 
h 
J^t 3t$tfc"of Utah. These fund* ara to Inaura WoodtJda that Buyer will comprete tht 
purchase of the home. Buyt»r hereby removes all contingencies and conditions precedent which may have boon specifically listed In 
paragraph 15 of tha Earnest Money Sal** Agroement for Rosldentlsl Construction and paragraph C of Addendum -A'* to the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement lor Residential Construction, respectively. 
in the srent Buyer does not consummate the purchase of tha home within tiro business days following completion of eonitruetlon, as 
evidenced by a Final Inspection and Certlflcrito of OccupAnoy Issued by the City/County of ^ / J r ^ A ^ I / / ^ . / l o t / shall be 
retained by Woodelde as liquidated damages. The foregoing sentence shall not raotiict nor limit any of the rights Woodalde may huva as a 
result of Buyer's default hereunder, including the right to seek and obtain specific performance. 
Woodslde hereby agrees to begin construction of the home and agrees that the funds aforementioned shall be credited to Buyer as part of 
downpaymenl or closing costs, If and only t^Buyer takaa title to the home within the fhre business days following flnaJ Inspection as outlined 
abort. 
Completion Dab 
The final completion date as contained In paragraph a (o) of the 
4, Une one of Addendum "A" thereto is heraby amended 
This final completion date may be automatically extended 
tors beyond Woodalde's control for a period equal to the duration ol such Interruption. 
Job Bile Vrtltt 
Tht construction site U a dangerous pl«cg to vlell. Buyer agr«»» to exerolee extreme caution ir Buyer chooses to visit the site, to limit the 
number of auch visits, and to refrain from allowing Buysr'i or other children to accompany Buyer on such visits. Buyer, to tha fullest extent 
permitted by letr, agrees to hold harmless Wood*!de (including Its nfllllatot and subsidiaries and other contrsctora and subcontractor and 
their agents and employees) from any and alt claims, damages, to** and expenses, Including but not limited to attorney's leas, arising out of 
any death, accident, injury, or other occurrence resulting from visits to tha Job site by Buyef Of Buyer's family of other guests. 
LocMn 
Buyer agroos that any lock.in nf an Intereot rate with lander Is done entirely at his own risk and dlsoretlon, Buy*r agrees to hold harmless 
Woodslde and any of Its agonts or representatives If final completion extends boyond any lock-In period that Buyer may negotiate with the 
Under. Any estimate of a possible completion date solicited by Buyer for the purpose of ascertaining a lock-m period, arranging for the 
move, airing a landlord notice, or for any other purposo shall be and Is understood by Buyer to be only an estimate and Shall not serve to 
modify the delivery provisions contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement lor Residential Construction or any addendum thereto. In-
cluding this addendum. 
Inttrett Rett* 
Interest rates fluotuate on a dally basis. Buyer therefore acknowledges that the rata at closing may be higher,-tower, or tha same as that 
which la available at the time this document i» executed. Buyer acknowledges that any Information aoflcrttd from Woodslde or their 
aforementioned afUlltttos or agents concerning future Interest rate levels, points, vr whether It la prudent to look-in a rate la porory opinion 
and Buyer hereby agrees to hold these parties harmless from any loss or action which may ooour from basing financial decisions on a'ald opl» 
nlons. 
This agreement shall not restrict nor limit any of the rights either party may have by virtue of tha Earnest Money 8alee Agreement for Residen-
tial Construction or any addendurns thereto which have beon executed previously. 
Limitation on Warranties 
i-
The lelont of paragraph 7 of Addendum "AH ^TW hereby Incorporated by referenoe Into this docurneiu. 
Sales Consultant 
FINAL ACCEPTANCE Tho foregoing Addondum "B 
WOCDSIDS HOMOC CORPOftATlOl 
A, (^^acknowledge 
Oils 
Buyer 
lonthl* 7 * 1 * j 
Ipt of a flnaf copy of the forooolng Agreement bearing all signatures: 
OMES JTORPQRATION SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
TtTLI 
